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Non–technical Summary
This paper analyzes the determinants of unemployment duration and post unem-
ployment wages in West Germany for inflows into unemployment during the years 1996
and 1997. We focus on the effect of the length of entitlement periods for unemployment
benefits and the size of unemployment benefits. We use the German administrative
individual data with information on the entitlement length for unemployment benefits
and the level of unemployment benefits. In our empirical analysis of unemployment
duration we apply recently developed methods which are based on quantile regres-
sion. We reason that these methods are able to capture a variety of effects which are
suggested by economic theory.
Our estimation results suggest that the length of entitlement periods has only a
weak effect on the conditional distribution of unemployment duration of the aged 26-
49. Moreover, we do not find that individuals with longer entitlement lengths for
unemployment benefits have considerably higher post unemployment earnings.
There are further important effects. Unemployed with a low level of unemployment
benefit transfers show much longer unemployment duration. A low level of unemploy-
ment benefits is often a proxy for supplementary public assistance resulting in a higher
effective replacement ratio compared to effective replacement ratio associated with
higher unemployment benefits. For this reason incentives are lower to leave unemploy-
ment. Our analysis of post unemployment earnings shows that typically the increase
in wages after unemployment is higher for this group than for other groups. Other
estimated effects of the unemployment insurance are mainly insignificant or small. We
find evidence for a negative relationship between long term unemployment and post
unemployment wages.
We observe that estimated coefficients with market policy relevance can vary over
two definitions of unemployment used in the paper. This highlights the importance to
address data quality issues in applied econometric research. It shows that incomplete
information about individual employment trajectories due to missing spell informa-
tion in administrative data - even in presence of detailed information about policy
interventions - may prevent us to obtain precise estimates of the effect of policy in-
terventions. Our analysis of unemployment duration provides empirical evidence for
the inappropriateness of the proportional hazard assumption which is very popular in
applied duration analysis.
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Abstract: In light of nonstationary search theory (van den Berg, 1990), this paper
estimates the effects of benefit entitlement periods and the size of unemployment ben-
efits on unemployment durations and post–unemployment earnings in West Germany.
For the unemployment duration, we estimate censored Box–Cox quantile regression,
which is robust with respect to the specification of the unobserved error distribution
and avoids the common proportional hazard assumption. Our results suggest that the
length of benefit entitlement is only of minor importance for the duration of search
unemployment and for post unemployment wages. A high wage replacement rate in
the low wage sector seem to considerably elongate the duration of unemployment and
it is associated with higher post unemployment wages.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the determinants of unemployment duration and post unemploy-
ment wages in West Germany for inflows into unemployment during the years 1996
and 1997. We focus on the effect of unemployment benefits. Income support for the
unemployed in Germany comes from three sources. During the benefit entitlement
period, which depends on the length of previous employment, the unemployed are en-
titled for benefits which are related to their previous earnings as insurance payments.
After the end of the benefit entitlement period, the unemployed may receive the lower
unemployment assistance, which is means tested. In addition to receiving unemploy-
ment benefits or unemployment assistance, an unemployed may receive supplementary
public assistance, which is also means tested. We use unique administrative data from
the unemployment insurance records involving the actual level of unemployment ben-
efits, unemployment assistance, and the length of benefit entitlement periods. To our
knowledge, this is the first study for Germany which uses administrative information
on these variables. Changes in benefit levels over the course of an unemployment spell
are a feature of all unemployment insurance systems around the world.1 Hence, our
analysis for Germany should be of broader interest for other countries.
There exists already a large literature on the effects of unemployment benefits on
the duration of search unemployment.2 Meyer (2002) and OECD (2003) provide recent
surveys on the effects of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment.
Empirical studies for the US find significantly positive elasticities of duration with
respect to the potential duration of benefits. Meyer (1990) uses institutional changes
as a natural experiment to identify the effect of changes in unemployment insurance
on unemployment duration in a hazard rate model. The study finds that an increase
in the entitlement period by 1 week results in increase of unemployment duration by
0.1 to 0.2 weeks. Narendranathan, Nickell and Stern (1985) estimate a proportionate
hazard rate model with time varying benefits levels and time varying coefficients for
the UK. The authors find a positive elasticity of unemployment duration for men with
respect to the level of unemployment benefits. They do not find an impact for the long
term unemployed. Based on a non-stationary job search model, van den Berg (1990)
1See the survey in Meyer (2002). Van den Berg (1990) estimates a structural model for data from
the Netherlands in the 1980’s, where the institutional setup with an interaction of unemployment
benefits and public assistance was fairly similar to Germany in the 1990’s.
2We mean by search unemployment that we focus on unemployed who are still likely to look for
new jobs. In the German institutional setup, it is likely that a sizeable group of registered unemployed
are not looking for new jobs.
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estimates a structural search model with time varying benefits and a time invariant
wage offer distribution for the Netherlands. The study shows that the size of benefits
after two years, when transfers were reduced to the level of public assistance, affects
hazard rates considerably more than the benefit level during the first two years. Van
Ours and Vodopivec (2006a,b) provide quasi–experimental evidence for Slovenia that
a reduction in benefit entitlement periods strongly increased job finding rates, whereas
the quality of the post-unemployment jobs remained unaffected. The paper finds that
the change had no effect on either the type of the contract (temporary vs. permanent),
the duration of the postunemployment jobs, or the wage earned in this job. In contrast,
based on the European Community Household Panel for eight countries, Tatsiramos
(2006) finds there is a positive indirect effect of unemployment benefits on subsequent
employment duration. This effect is pronounced in countries with relatively generous
benefit systems like Germany.
The literature for Germany provides conflicting evidence: Some studies find a pos-
itive relationship between the length of unemployment benefit entitlements and un-
employment duration (Hunt, 1995, Plassmann, 2002; Steiner, 1997, 2001). In some
studies, the results depend on the specific sample or on the definition of unemploy-
ment in the data (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2006b, Lee and Wilke, 2005), while there
are also studies which do not find any effects (Decressin, 2001; Schneider and Hujer,
1997). Hunt (1995) analyzes the effects of the extension of benefit entitlement periods
for older workers during the 1980’s on the hazard rates from unemployment using data
from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). She uses a difference–in–differences
estimator based on interaction effects between age groups and time. The analysis finds
some significant positive effects of potential duration of benefits in Germany on the
actual duration of unemployment, but the standard errors of the estimated effects of
benefit durations are fairly high. Decressin (2001) tries to replicate Hunt’s (1995) re-
sults. She uses longer data from the GSOEP and pools data from West Germany for
1984 to 1996 with data from East Germany for 1992 to 1996. She redefines the treat-
ment of longer benefit duration by interacting it with dummy variables of actual benefit
receipt. The study concludes that the extensions of benefit duration in the 1980s did
not increase the duration of unemployment.3 For older workers above an age of 49, the
extension of benefit entitlement periods was associated with a strong increase in early
retirement (this issue is already discussed by Hunt, 1995). Based on administrative
3Similar to Decressin (2001), Schneider and Hujer (1997) using GSOEP data and Weber (1999)
using administrative data do not find effects of the institutional changes on the duration of unemploy-
ment until a new job is found.
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data, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006b) conclude that in fact the actual duration until
a job is found was not strongly affected by the extensions of benefit duration for older
worker. The conflicting evidence based on the GSOEP might be due to a number of
data problems, such as small sample sizes (Hunt, 1995; Decressin, 2001), heaping ef-
fects (Steiner, 1997; Schneider and Hujer, 1997), and recollection error (Ju¨rges, 2005).
There exist a smaller literature on the relationship between unemployment benefits
on post unemployemnt earnings in Germany. Using the GSOEP, Gangl (2002) finds
positive effects of longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits on the quality
of subsequent jobs regarding the wage level and the stability of employment (see also
Tatsiramos, 2006, as mentioned above). Using administrative data, Fitzenberger and
Wilke (2006b) find no such effects in response to the changes of benefit durations over
time.
Though not stated explicitly in some cases, a large part of the empirical literature
bases the reduced form analysis of the duration of unemployment and post unemploy-
ment outcomes on a stationary search model. However, with anticipated changes in
the benefit level over the course of an unemployment spell, the search behavior of the
unemployed should be analyzed using nonstationary search theory, as discussed among
others in van den Berg (1990) or Moffitt (1985).4 These authors state that modelling
hazard rates as functions of contemporaneous covariates with constant coefficients is
insufficient in such a nonstationary environment. Building on van den Berg (1990),
we discuss the implications of nonstationary search theory on the empirical analysis of
unemployment durations and post unemployment wages in section 2. We argue that
standard proportionate hazard rate models have to be modified in complex ways (some-
thing which is typically not done in applied work) to account for nonstationary search.
We suggest that estimating flexible quantile regressions of durations of unemployment
is a fruitful alternative for a reduced form analysis of unemployment duration. Van den
Berg (1990) estimates a structural model to account for nonstationary search, which
he himself refers to as an empirical illustration.5 Our data is too limited to estimate
a structural model, i.e. we would not want to make the rigid modelling assumptions
typically necessary to implement a structural model with such data.
Models for duration data are typically estimated using accelerated failure time
model or proportional hazard models, see van den Berg (2001) as a recent survey.
Quantile regression has been emerging as an attractive alternative (Koenker and Bil-
4See also the earlier literature cited in van den Berg (1990).
5The structural model estimated in van den Berg (1990) is build on the assumption of a time–
invariant wage offer distribution and on information in the data involving subjective expectations
about the offer wages by the unemployed.
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ias, 2001; Koenker and Geling, 2001; Portnoy, 2003). Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006a)
provide a recent survey on the use of quantile regression for duration analysis. Quantile
regression model the changes of quantiles of the conditional distribution of the dura-
tion in response to changes of the covariates. This paper applies Box–Cox quantile
regression (Powell, 1991; Buchinsky, 1995; Machado and Mata, 2001) as a flexible ap-
proach to model the impact of time invariant covariates on durations. This approach
allows for impacts of covariates to change with the elapsed duration, thus allowing for
flexible duration dependence specific to the individual observed covariates, a feature
which is quite appealing in light of nonstationary search theory. A quantile regression
models the distribution of the duration in a more flexible way than accelerated failure
time models or the Cox proportional hazard model because they do not restrict the
variation of estimated coefficients over the quantiles.
In search theory and in applied duration analysis, there is a strong focus on haz-
ard rates. Quantile regression estimates can be used to infer the implied hazard rate
by the elapsed duration of unemployment depending on an individuals characteristics.
Machado and Portugal (2002) and Machado, Portugal, and Guimara˜es (2006) have
introduced a simple simulation method to obtain the conditional hazard rates implied
by the quantile regression estimates. This paper uses a slightly modified version of
their estimator introduced in Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006a). The modifications are
necessary to account for censored data and to fix a general smoothing related finite
sample problem. Using this method, it is straightforward to analyze duration depen-
dence without having to assume that the pattern estimated for the so-called baseline
hazard in proportional hazard rate models applies uniformly to all observations with
different covariates.
In our application, we use the IAB employment subsample (IABS).6 We use addi-
tional variables with exact information about the entitlement length for unemployment
benefits and the level of unemployment compensation. These data allow us to investi-
gate effects of the unemployment insurance system on the distribution of unemployment
duration and on post unemployment wages in Germany. Important limitations per-
sist such as that the data do not identify the true length of unemployment duration
(Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2006b; Lee and Wilke, 2005). We take account of this prob-
lem and check the robustness of our empirical results with respect to the definition of
unemployment in the data.
This paper extends previous studies in three aspects: First, we apply censored Box-
6The IAB-Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe (IABS) of the data research center (FDZ) of the BA at the
Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB).
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Cox quantile regression (Powell, 1991) for unemployment duration, which contains the
linear and the log linear model as special cases. This method allows for new insights
into the conditional distribution of unemployment duration compared to former stud-
ies for Germany (Hunt, 1995; Hujer and Schneider, 1997; Decressin, 2001; Plassmann,
2002 and others) who apply conventional proportional hazard models or Lu¨demann et
al. (2006) who apply log linear quantile regression to data without precise informa-
tion about unemployment benefits. We argue that quantile regression are a fruitful
approach in light of nonstationary search theory. Beyond our substantive analysis, we
are the first to apply censored Box-Cox quantile regression for duration analysis. We
use the algorithm developed in Fitzenberger et al. (2004), which addresses an important
numerical problem arising when implementing Box–Cox quantile regression. Second,
we use more recent and more comprehensive administrative data than the previous lit-
erature, since we have exact information about the size of transfer payments from the
federal employment agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, BA) and the length of entitle-
ment periods. Third, we present a more comprehensive analysis of post unemployment
earnings by applying a variety of parametric and nonparametric methods.
Our estimation results suggest that the length of entitlement periods has only a
weak effect on the conditional distribution of unemployment duration. While it is
generally small for short unemployment duration, it increases for the higher quantiles
of the unemployment duration distribution, in particular for the older unemployed
with extended entitlement periods for unemployment benefits. In contrast, one would
have expected that an increase benefit duration affects in particular the lower quan-
tiles below two years of unemployment. The estimated effects for lower quantiles are
ambiguous: they are either small or results are sensitive to the definition of unem-
ployment. Our results therefore suggest that the true effect is rather small for early
quitters of unemployment, for whom chances are very small, that they do not find a job
early in their unemployment spell. There are further important effects. Unemployed
with a low level of unemployment benefit transfers show much longer unemployment
duration.7 A low level of unemployment benefits is often a proxy for supplementary
public assistance resulting in a higher effective replacement ratio compared to effective
replacement ratio associated with higher unemployment benefits. We also analyze the
effect on post unemployment wages. We observe that high replacement ratios of low
wage unemployed coincide with upward movements in the earnings distribution. Other
estimated effects of the unemployment insurance are mainly insignificant or small. We
7See also Lu¨demann et al. (2006) or Wichert and Wilke (2005) who use the pre–unemployment
wage as a proxy.
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find evidence for a negative relationship between long term unemployment and post
unemployment wages which we take as evidence for a deterioration of the offer wage
distribution over the course of an unemployment spell.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses nonsta-
tionary search theory and its implications on the empirical analysis of unemployment
duration. Information about the data and the institutional setup is given in section 3.
The econometric framework is presented in section 4. The empirical results are given
in section 5, followed by a short summary.
2 Nonstationary Search and Duration of Unemploy-
ment
Under the institutional setting in Germany at the end of the 1990’s, benefit entitlement,
as anticipated by the unemployed at the beginning of the unemployment spell, changes
at a finite number of points of time and is piecewise constant otherwise.8 Apart from
a possible delay in benefit entitlement at the beginning of the unemployment spell (see
section 3 for further details), unemployed individuals expect benefits to be nonincreas-
ing over time, with the exhaustion of unemployment benefits resulting in a decline of
income depending on the economic situation of the unemployed’s household. In this
situation, the search behavior of the unemployed should be analyzed using nonstation-
ary search theory, as discussed among others in van den Berg (1990) or Moffitt (1985).
Van den Berg (1990) characterizes the reservation wage of the unemployed under per-
fect foresight allowing for a finite number of discrete changes in the benefit level. Under
further plausible assumptions on the dynamics of the offer wage distribution and the
job arrival rates, the reservation wage changes continuously over time (Theorem 1 in
van den Berg, 1990). In fact, the reservation wage will decline with elapsed duration
of unemployment because the benefit level is declining eventually and the offer wage
distribution is likely to deteriorate over time.
Based on the theoretical considerations in van den Berg (1990), we draw the follow-
ing conclusions: First, the hazard rates from unemployment to employment are likely
to change continuously with elapsed duration of unemployment. Second, it remains an
empirical question whether the hazard rates increase or decrease over time because the
deterioration of the offer wage distribution may counteract the decline in the reserva-
tion wage (this point is implicit in van den Berg, 1990, but not discussed in detail).
8Benefits can also be interrupted by sanctions, which, however, are likely to be of minor importance
for our application because in many cases they are withdrawn after a few days. See Wilke (2004).
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Third, post unemployment wages should ceteris paribus be negatively associated with
the actual duration of unemployment. Fourth, they should be positively associated
with the length of benefit entitlement periods as anticipated by the unemployed at the
beginning of the unemployment spell and with the size of benefits. This is the quality
argument suggesting that more generous unemployment benefits result on average in a
better job match (job quality) observed ex post (see Gangl, 2002). Fifth, theory does
not predict an unambiguous empirical relationship between the benefit level and the
duration of unemployment for the following two reasons. Unemployment benefits are
positively correlated with offer wages, whereas the levels of unemployment assistance
and supplementary public assistance are likely to be negatively correlated with the
offer wage, because the latter are means tested.
An important conceptual insight from nonstationary job search theory is that en-
titlement effects, which reflect anticipated changes in the benefit level, may affect the
entire distribution of the unemployment duration in a nonuniform way. Hazard rates
are affected in a complex way by benefit changes depending on the elapsed duration
of unemployment relative to the entitlement period and the size of transfers after a
benefit change. Modeling hazard rates as functions of contemporaneous covariates
with constant coefficients is insufficient in such a nonstationary environment, see van
den Berg (1990, section 5.1) and Moffitt (1985). In addition, a proportional hazard
assumption involving a common baseline hazard is unlikely to be plausible for a par-
simonious econometric specification, since theory suggests individual starting points
and individual dynamics for the reservation wage as a function of elapsed duration.9
Theory predicts further that the length of the entitlement period of a specific benefit
does not affect hazard rates after the exhaustion of this benefit (van den Berg, 1990,
section 3). Nevertheless, the quantiles of the duration distribution, which lie above
the exhaustion period, are affected through the effect on the hazard rates before the
exhaustion of benefit entitlement.10
9There have been various suggestions in the literature to address these issues within a proportionate
hazard model. Narendranathan et al. (1985) use the period specific benefit level as covariates and
let the coefficient change over time. This approach does not take account of the anticipation effects,
resulting in a declining impact of current period benefits as the end of entitlement approaches. Hujer
and Schneider (1995) use time until exhaustion of benefits to account for the changing influence on
exit rates to employment over time, which allows to capture the anticipated effect of the changing
benefit level. This approach restricts the influence of time until exhaustion to be the same irrespective
of the total length of benefit entitlements and the size of the transfer (unemployment assitance, public
assistance) after exhaustion of unemployment benefits.
10This is due to the well known relationship between the distribution function and the integrated
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3 Data and Institutions
The analysis is based on comprehensive merged administrative data with exact infor-
mation about the length of entitlement periods and the level of unemployment compen-
sation drawn by the unemployed. We use the IAB employment subsample 1975-2001
augmented by supplementary detailed information on income transfers from the federal
employment agency (BA≡Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) and some firm level information.
The data are a 2% random sample of employees subject to social security taxation in
Germany. These spell data involve individual employment trajectories on a daily basis,
combining employment periods and periods of transfer payments from the BA during
the period 1975-2001 for about 1.1 Mio. individuals in West Germany (see Hamann et
al., 2004 or Bender et al., 2000).11 Income transfers from the BA are unemployment
benefits (UB), unemployment assistance (UA), or income maintenance during further
training (IMT). Periods of self-employment and life time civil servants are not iden-
tifiable in the data.12 The data are not merged with information about employment
subsidies paid by the employment agency. Hence, it is impossible to distinguish be-
tween regular and subsidized employment. Periods of unemployment without receipt
of income transfers from the BA are also not identifiable.
For the reasons stated above, we cannot identify the true length of (search) un-
employment spells in an economic sense, see also Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006b) and
Lee and Wilke (2005). Also, since the reason for the termination of employment is not
recorded, it is not possible to infer the reason for unemployment such as displacement.
Missing periods in the employment trajectories, i.e. periods without employment or
transfers, cause only partial identification of the unemployment period. As a natu-
ral approach, we work with different proxies for the true unemployment period: the
Nonemployment (NE) proxy of Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006b) is used as an upper
bound for the true unemployment duration (in the sense of first order stochastic dom-
inance).
hazard rate, i.e. for duration T
Pr(T ≤ t) = 1− exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds
)
where λ(s) is the hazard rate at elapsed duration s.
11We exclude the data for East Germany for our analysis.
12In fact, if there is an unobserved period in the individual employment trajectory this may corre-
spond to several labor market states: self employment, civil servant, unemployment, out of the labor
force or retirement.
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Nonemployment (NE): all periods of nonemployment after an employment
period which contain at least one period with income transfers by the German
federal labor office. The nonemployment period is considered as censored if
the last record involves a UB, UA, or IMT payment that is not followed by an
employment spell.13 In such a case, we do not know whether the individual
is still unemployed, out of labor force, or even self-employed. The spell is not
censored if we observe later a successful exit to employment. This definition of
unemployment includes the periods of nonemployment (out of the labor force,
public assistance) which are not explicitly recorded in the data.
As a second proxy for unemployment in the data, we use the UPIT (Unemployment
with Permanent Income Transfers) proxy of Lee and Wilke (2005) which serves as a
lower bound for the true unemployment duration. This definition excludes cases where
some part of the unemployment spell is not associated with income transfers from the
BA.14
Unemployment with Permanent Income Transfers (UPIT): all peri-
ods of nonemployment after an employment period with a continuous flow
of unemployment compensation from the BA. The maximum interruption in
compensation transfers is one month in the case of cutoff times: six weeks. An
observation is marked as right censored at the last day of the duration before
the transfers are interrupted for more than one month or in the event of there
being no observation after the last compensation transfer.
We exclude periods of unemployment which are not directly identifiable from the
data. Note that an NE spell may not fulfill the conditions of UPIT, if there is no
income transfer within six weeks after the end of the employment period. For this
reason unemployment spells after a voluntary job quit are excluded by the definition
of UPIT (if such a voluntary nature of a quit is known to the case worker in the
employment agency). This is the main reason why there are more NE spells than
UPIT spells. Note also that if a spell is both UPIT and NE then its NE duration is
greater than or equal to UPIT. In our econometric analysis, we argue that a result is
robust with respect to the definition of unemployment, if we obtain the same estimation
result for the two proxies. Such a robust result may, however, still not hold for the true
unemployment duration.
14About two third in the stock of registered unemployed in Germany draw income transfers from
the BA. There is no corresponding spell level information available.
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We impose further restrictions on the samples analyzed in order to make them
more homogeneous. We only consider unemployment spells which begin with unem-
ployment benefits as income transfer and who do not have a foregoing unemployment
spell within the year before the start of the current spell. We only include spells if the
last employer was located in West Germany and if the spell began in 1996 or in 1997.
Furthermore, we restrict the sample to males in the age group 26 to 49 years.15 We
exclude spells with recent unemployment periods from the sample in order to construct
a ”stable employment before unemployment design”. Remaining spells have therefore
longer entitlement periods than the average unemployed below 50 years. For reasons of
generality, we remark that our heuristic but rather simple rule may of course exclude
displaced workers and it still includes seasonal unemployment to some extent. The
descriptive summary statistics of the samples is available in table 2. It is apparent
that the composition of the samples for the two unemployment proxies are similar.
Furthermore, there are less UPIT spell and UPIT spells are shorter.
The unemployment compensation system during the 1990s
Unemployment benefit transfers are insurance payments and socially insured employed
qualify for UB entitlements if they have worked at least 12 months during the past three
to seven years. Since 1994, the wage replacement ratio for unemployment benefits is
63% or 67% and the higher rate only applies in the presence of children in the household.
Depending on the work history and on the age of the unemployed, the entitlement
length is up to 12 months for young and mid aged (less than 42 years old) unemployed
and up to 32 months for older unemployed.16 The entitlement length for unemployment
benefits in Germany depends on the duration of socially insured employment during
a certain base period (past seven years). Therefore only older individuals with long
employment periods have extended entitlement periods (>12 months). In our specific
sample the maximum possible entitlement length is 26 months but there are just few
observations with more than 24 months. Starting in 1997, the maximum entitlement
15We also did estimations for females. Results have often the same sign but the magnitude of
estimated coefficients differ. In particular, results for females are less sharp and less clear, i.e. the
estimated standard errors are greater. This is in accordance with the results of Biewen and Wilke
(2005) and may be explained by family background related labor force withdrawals (see Wichert and
Wilke, 2005).
16These institutional rules are valid from 1987 to 1997. General details about the German unem-
ployment compensation system during the 1990s can be found in Decressin (2001) or in Plassmann
(2002).
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length for unemployment benefits were reduced.17 Since this reform only applied to
newly generated entitlements, effects on actual entitlement periods lag by several years.
In fact, actual entitlement periods started to decrease in 1998 or even later.18 Due to
its legal design, there is no incentive for anticipation effects before the reform for
employees below age 50.19 Therefore, it is unlikely that the results of our analysis are
affected by the reform in 1997. We also exclude the less than 26 years old from our
analysis, since there is evidence that a large share of young unemployed enter subsidized
employment (see Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2006a). An exit to subsidized employment
is not identifiable in our data and systematic labor market policies for specific traget
groups such as the young individuals would possibly causes a bias.
Comparing our sample to all unemployment spells in West Germany starting in
1996 or 1997, we observe that our sample only comprises about 12% of all IABS un-
employment spells. Our sample has longer entitlement periods than the full sample
(compare tables 1 and 2, appendix). Apart from the age restriction, this is mainly due
to the fact that we consider unemployed with quite a stable employment history before
unemployment. While preparing the data for the estimations we encountered further
data quality issues. The original variable ”entitlement length for unemployment bene-
fits” contains about 50% missing values. Since the entitlement length is not a random
variable we impute the missing values by the median of the observed entitlement length
conditional to age, calender year and relevant length of foregoing employment spells
within the qualification period for UB. We then classified the entitlement length to
four intervals. We constructed three categories for the level of unemployment compen-
sation: low earners who are likely to receive supplementary public assistance.20 The
main segment of the sample population falls into the middle interval between 25 and
40 EUR daily income transfers. The third category represents the upper tail of the
distribution, i.e. the recipients of very high income transfers.
Building on the results of Lu¨demann et al. (2006), we construct pooled education
and business sector categories, since finer classifications suggest only minor differences
in results. We also tried a number of other variables which did not yield sizeable
effects.21 Several interactions between the amount of unemployment compensation
17See Wolff (2003) for further institutional details on this issue.
18See also Wolff (2003) or Mu¨ller et al. (2007) for a microeconometric evaluation of this reform.
19See also Mu¨ller et al. (2007) who do not even find anticipation effects for those aged >50.
20The level of public assistance is such that it depends upon the household composition, other
household income and on the community (see Wilke, 2006). Since it is impossible to determine
recipience of public assistance from our data, we take a low level of unemployment compensation
transfers as a rough proxy for supplementary public assistance.
21These variables are: unemployed in the past, location within West- or East Germany of the first
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received, the entitlement length, and the company size yield point estimates of high
magnitude. Since there are just a few observations falling into these categories, it was
not possible to achieve numerically stable results.22 For this reason, we excluded them
from the analysis in this paper. A larger data set would allow one to trace out these
effects more precisely.
4 Econometric Analysis
The empirical analysis of unemployment duration is a widely investigated field in labor
market research. Nonparametric estimators are often applied for data exploration, e.g.
the Kaplan-Meier estimator. They do not impose strong assumptions at the expense
that they only work in very low dimensions. This implies that results have a rather
descriptive nature. Comprehensive semi-parametric duration models are applied in
order to control for the composition of individuals. These models often belong to the
class of accelerated failure time or proportional hazard models. While it is possible
to control for the composition of individuals these models clearly impose stronger as-
sumption than nonparametric approaches. In the framework of hazard rate estimation
there are two important model implications which are often subject to criticism: first,
the proportionality of conditional hazard rates, the key model assumption, may not be
fulfilled and second, the presence of unobserved variables even if they are independent
of the observed covariates, can cause estimation bias, if one does not appropriately
control for it.
In this paper, we apply censored Box–Cox quantile regression as an alternative
estimator which requires less assumptions on the shape of the conditional hazard rates
and which is fairly robust with respect to a random effects assumption, where the
random effect is independent of the covariates (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2006a). Based
on the estimated coefficients of censored Box-Cox quantile regression, we use a modified
version of the simulation approach suggested by Machado et al. (2006) to estimate
conditional hazard rates. A main disadvantage of any quantile regression approach for
duration analysis is that it is restricted to the case of time–invariant covariates.
employment spell of the unemployed, length of foregoing tenure (which is correlated with the enti-
tlement length for unemployment benefits), simultaneous employment and receipt of unemployment
compensation at the beginning of the unemployment and minor employment relation (Mini-Job) at
the beginning of the unemployment spell.
22We first estimated a slightly simplified version of the specification described in the next section.
This was done in order to keep the problem manageable in light of the huge computation time needed,
see below.
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Censored Box-Cox quantile regression
We estimate nonlinear quantile regression for duration data involving the estimation
of an accelerated failure time model at different quantiles θ ∈ (0, 1) for the completed
duration Ti of spell i
(1) qθ(hθ(Ti)|xi) = x′iβθ
where qθ(hθ(Ti)|xi) is the θ-quantile conditional on xi. For a flexible transformation
function hθ(.), equation (1) nests the standard proportionate hazard model with time–
invariant covariates (Koenker and Geling, 2001; Portnoy, 2003).23
We choose to specify the transformation hθ(.) as the Box–Cox transformation in-
troduced by Box and Cox (1964):
h(T ) = Tλ,i =
(T λi − 1)/λ if λ 6= 0log(Ti) if λ = 0,
where λ ∈ R. Due to the equivariance property of the Box–Cox transformation, equa-
tion 1 effectively models the conditional quantiles of durations Ti as
(3) qθ(Ti|x) =
(λx′iβθ + 1)1/λ if λ 6= 0exp(x′iβθ) if λ = 0, ,
provided λx′iβ
θ+1 ≥ 0 for λ 6= 0. Let the observed duration be possibly right censored
in the flow sample, i.e. the observed completed duration Ti is given by
Ti = min{T ∗i , yci}
where T ∗i is the true duration of the spell and yci is the spell specific threshold value
(censoring point) beyond which the spell can not be observed.
23For a proportionate hazard model with time–invariant covariates, define the integrated baseline
hazard Λ0(t) =
∫ t
0
λ0(t˜)dt˜, then the following well known generalization of the accelerated failure time
model holds
(2) log(Λ0(Ti)) = x′iβ + ²i
with ²i again following an extreme value distribution and β = −β˜ with β˜ being the coefficients of
the proportionate hazard model. Thus, the proportional hazard rate model implies a linear regression
model for the a priori unknown transformation h(Ti) = log(Λ0(Ti)). This regression model involves
an error term with an a priori known distribution of the error term and a constant coefficient vector
across quantiles, see Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006a).
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A censored Box–Cox quantile regression amounts to minimize the following objec-
tive
minβ,λ
∑
i
ρθ(Ti −min[(λx′iβ + 1)1/λ, yci]),
where the check function is given by ρθ(t) = [θI(t ≥ 0) + (1 − θ)I(t < 0)]|t| and I(.)
denotes the indicator function.
Chamberlain (1994) and Buchinsky (1995) suggest a numerically attractive two step
procedure to implement a Box–Cox quantile regression, which exploits the equivariance
property of quantiles. In a practical implementation, it is not guaranteed that λx′iβ +
1 ≥ 0 holds for all observations during the iteration of the optimization problem to
the solution or even for the final estimator. Fitzenberger et al. (2004) analyze in
detail this numerical problem, which had been ignored in the literature before. The
study suggests a simple modification of the two step procedure by Chamberlain and
Buchinsky and shows its good numerical properties by means of a simulation study. For
the empirical results presented in this paper, we use the straightforward adaptation of
the procedure suggested in Fitzenberger et al. (2004) to the case of censored Box–Cox
quantile regression, see appendix I. Based on Machado and Mata (2000) and recently
Fitzenberger et al. (2004), our implemention of censored Box–Cox quantile regression
yields a
√
N–consistent estimator and the asymptotic covariance matrix follows from
standard considerations for nonlinear estimation. In our application, the censored
Box–Cox quantile regressions requires a huge computational effort. For this reason we
estimate censored Box-Cox quantile regression on a quantile grid on [0.06, 0.9] with
step size 0.01.
Conditional nonparametric hazard rates
Duration analysis often focuses on conditional hazard rates which can be derived from
the distribution of unemployment duration conditional upon covariates. Machado and
Portugal (2002) and Machado et al. (2006) suggest a resampling procedure (henceforth
denoted as MPG) to obtain the hazard rates implied by the estimated quantile regres-
sion. Zhang (2004) and Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006a) suggest a modified version
for right censored data. The main idea of the MPG is to simulate data based on the
estimated quantile regressions for the conditional distribution of Ti given the covariate
and to estimate the density and the distribution function directly from the simulated
data.
In detail, MPG is adapted to censored Box–Cox quantile regressions as follows (see
Machado and Portugal, 2002; Machado et al., 2006; Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2006a):
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1. Generate M independent random draws θm,m = 1, ...,M from a uniform distri-
bution on (θl, θu), i.e. extreme quantiles with θ < θl or θ > θu are not considered
here. θl and θu are chosen in light of the type and the degree of censoring in the
data. Additional concerns relate to the fact that quantile regression estimates at
extreme quantiles are typically statistically less reliable, and that duration data
might exhibit a mass point at zero or other extreme values. The benchmark case
with the entire distribution is given by θl = 0 and θu = 1.
24
2. For each θm, estimate the censored Box–Cox quantile regression model obtaining
M vectors βθm , λθ.
3. For a given value of the covariates x0, the sample of size M with the simulated
durations is obtained as,
T ∗m ≡ qˆθm(T |x0) = (λθx′iβθ + 1)1/λθ with m = 1, ...,M .
We use the same adjustment as described in appendix I when λθx
′
iβ
θ + 1 < 0.
4. Based on the sample {T ∗m,m = 1, ...,M}, estimate the conditional density f ∗(t|x0)
and the conditional distribution function F ∗(t|x0).
5. The hazard rate conditional on x0 and conditional on the durations drawn in the
interval (θl, θu)
25 is estimated by
λˆ0(t) =
(θu − θl)f ∗(t|x0)
1− θl − (θu − θl)F ∗(t|x0) .
MPG uses a kernel estimator for the conditional density
f ∗(t|x0) = 1
M b
M∑
m=1
K
(
t− T ∗i
b
)
where b is the bandwidth and K(.) the kernel function. Based on this density estimate,
the distribution function estimator is
F ∗(t|x0) = 1
M
M∑
m=1
K
(
t− T ∗i
b
)
with K(u) =
∫ t
a
K(v) dv .
24In our application, θl = 0.06 and θu = 0.9, see above. Random numbers are then drawn from
a discrete uniform distribution which has the quantile grid points as support points. This increases
computation time significantly at the cost of small approximation errors.
25Simulating the full distribution (θl = 0 and θu = 1), it follows by definition: λˆ0(t) = f∗(t|x0)/[1−
F ∗(t|x0)].
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Machado and Portugal (2002) and Machado et al. (2006) suggest to start the integra-
tion at zero (a = 0), which is probably motivated by durations being strictly positive.
However, the kernel density estimator also puts probability mass into the region of neg-
ative durations, which can be sizeable with a large bandwidth, see Silverman (1986,
section 2.10). For this reason, we use a kernel density estimator based on log durations.
This is possible when observed durations are always strictly positive, i.e. there is no
mass point at zero. The estimates for density and distribution function for the dura-
tion itself are easily derived from the density estimates for log duration by applying an
appropriate transformation.26
5 Empirical Results
We first investigate the duration of unemployment and then post-unemployment earn-
ings.
5.1 Unemployment Duration
The estimation of the censored Box-Cox qunatile regression for both definitions of un-
employment Nonemployment (NE) and Unemployment with Permanent Income Trans-
fers (UPIT) took us about three months on a Xeon 2.4 GHz with TSP 4.5 for Linux.27
Figure 1 presents the estimated coefficient of the Box-Cox transformation. The esti-
mated λ increases from quantile 0.2 to 0.9, while there is no clear pattern for the lowest
quantiles. The results suggest a linear relationship (λ = 1) for the highest quantiles
and a log-linear relationship λ = 0) for quantiles in the range 0.3 to 0.6. Results for
the lowest quantiles do not show a clear–cut pattern. There were some numerical prob-
lems at low quantiles for UPIT which we believe to have addressed in a satisfactory
way.28 For the lowest quantiles the estimation results for the lambda coefficients (and
simultaneously for the β-coefficients) appear to be quite volatile over the quantiles. At
the same time, however, the predicted duration still varies smoothly over the quantiles
26Silverman (1986, section 2.10) discusses further alternatives for this problem.
27For this reason, we are only able to present bootstrap standard errors for a small number of cases.
28In the case of UPIT, the censored quantile regression estimator did not converge for low quantiles
in some cases. This is surprising since the problem of right censoring should be negligible for low
quantiles. To overcome these, we estimated standard (non-censored) quantile regressions in these
problematic cases. This approach is justified because only 2 to 4% of the fitted values lie above the
censoring point of the corresponding observation. Note that censored quantile regression corresponds
to a standard quantile regression when all fitted values of the censored quantile regression lie below
the respective censoring point.
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because the variation in λ and β balances out.
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Figure 1: Estimated Box Cox transformation coefficient λ.
To assess the impact of the covariates on unemployment duration it does not suffice
to consider the βλ,θ-coefficients alone. Therefore, we compute local partial effects by
the estimated percentage change of the conditional quantile function when the k’th
regressor switches from 0 to 1 (note that all covariates are dummy variables). This may
be written as (qˆθ(T |x1)− qˆθ(T |x0))/qˆθ(T |x0), where x0 and x1 are vectors of regressors
which only differ in the k’th element. We compute the change at the sample mean of
the other regressors. Due to the huge computational effort, it is not possible to report
comprehensive standard errors. Table 3, however, presents estimated standard errors
for selected quantiles using 50 bootstrap resamples of the NE data. It is evident that
many estimated effects are likely to be significant and that standard errors increase at
the upper quantiles.
The estimated partial effects for all covariates are displayed in figures 3 and 4 in
the appendix. It is apparent that older unemployed, unemployed with very long en-
titlement periods for unemployment periods, who worked in a large company or who
receive a low level of unemployment benefit transfers have considerable longer unem-
ployment periods. Some of these estimates may be affected by early retirement or by
individuals who actually withdraw from the labor force. Low earning individuals before
unemployment are likely to be entitled to supplementary public assistance. Thus, this
group of unemployed has typically a considerably higher wage replacement ratio (even
larger than one is possible) than the other unemployed. This generates disincentives for
accepting new jobs because of high reservation wages (Christensen, 2005). Our results
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therefore confirm rather descriptive evidence of Wichert and Wilke (2005), who apply
a bivariate nonparametric model. Unemployment related to seasonal unemployment
or to temporary lay-offs is shorter (winter, recall, agriculture, construction). Surpris-
ingly this is still present to some extent in our sample even after conditioning on not
receiving unemployment benefits in the year prior to current unemployment.29
The estimated hazard rates (see figure 2) based on the MPG procedure further
illustrate these findings using a different representation. Interestingly, several profiles
for hazard rates are not proportional to other estimated profiles. In some cases, we
even find crossings. This suggests that a proportional hazard model is not empirically
supported by our results. Moreover, we do not observe peaks in the nonparametric haz-
ard rates at the points when the unemployment benefits entitlement period exhausts,
e.g. after 12 months of unemployment.
Let us interpret further the results for unemployment benefits and entitlement pe-
riods in light of the theoretical discussion in section 2 on nonstationary search theory.
Based on the partial effects displayed in figures 3 and 4 and the associated standard er-
rors reported in table 3 for some cases there are noticeable differences across quantiles.
Entitlement periods between 6 and 12 months do not increase unemployment duration
relative to the reference case 1 to 6 months.30 This is confirmed by the estimated
hazard rates. An extended benefit entitlement period between 12 and 18 months, how-
ever, results in a significantly longer unemployment duration and lower hazard rates.
However, the absolute size of the effect of benefit entitlement periods is fairly small (at
most 20 days for the group with 12 and 18 months).
Despite the volatility of the estimated partial effects, the estimated hazard rates
are very smooth (of course this is partly the result of kernel smoothing involved in
the MPG procedure) and show that hazard rates are lower with longer benefit enti-
tlement periods. The effect is even stronger for a benefit entitlement period above 18
months. All estimated hazard rates are falling over time and the decline is steeper
at early durations. In accordance to nonstationary search theory, our results suggest
that unemployed do not wait systematically until the end of the benefit entitlement
period before they accept a new job. However, nonstationary search theory would also
29Lu¨demann et al. (2006) obtain similar results using all unemployment spells starting in the period
1981-1995 of the 26-41 years old using a log-linear censored quantile regression model. However, the
magnitude of their estimated effects differ in several case. This may be explained by different samples
or by their less flexible econometric specification.
30If anything, the longer benefit entitlement (especially for UPIT) seems to be associated with
shorter unemployment duration, a result with can only be rationalized as a remaining sorting effect
despite conditioning on a stable employment history before the beginning of unemployment.
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predict that hazard rates of unemployed with different entitlement periods should con-
verge ceteris paribus with elapsed unemployment duration because the search behavior
of those with longer entitlement periods converges to the search behavior of unemployed
without unemployment benefits (possibly receiving unemployment assistance or public
assistance) with elapsed duration. However, the estimated hazard rates evolve almost
in parallel fashion for the unemployed with different entitlement periods. Put together,
our evidence suggests that the effect of entitlement periods is fairly small and seems to
be nonexistent for 6 to 12 months relative to 1 to 6 months. This result is in accordance
with our previous work in Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006b) and the results reported in
van den Berg (1990), because the latter study finds the transfer payments after the
end of the entitlement periods to be more important compared to the level of initial
benefits during the first two years of unemployment.
Turning to the size of unemployment benefits, we find that unemployed with a
low level of unemployment benefits (< 25 Euro per day)) show longer unemployment
durations and unemployed with a high level (> 40 Euro per day)) show shorter un-
employment durations (mainly in the upper part of the distribution) compared to the
reference group 25–40 Euro. The hazard rates for those with the lowest benefit level
are much lower at short elapsed durations and decline much less compared to the two
other groups. At long elapsed durations of unemployment the hazard rates converge
for the three benefit levels. This evidence can be rationalized by nonstationary search
theory considering that individuals with the lowest benefit level are the most likely to
be eligible for (supplementary) public assistance and their offer wage distribution is
worse than for the two other benefit groups. In addition, the offer wage distribution
in the low wage labor market is less likely to deteriorate with elapsed unemployment
duration because of wage floors (rigid union wages or wages not falling below the level
of public assistance). These considerations can explain that both the level of hazard
rates and the decline in hazard rates increases with the benefit level. Furthermore, it is
clear that it would be difficult to rationalize these findings based on stationary search
theory.
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Figure 2: Estimated conditional hazard rates a the sample means of the other regres-
sors.
5.2 Post Unemployment Earnings
We analyze the determinants of post unemployment earnings with a focus on unem-
ployment benefits and benefit entitlement using various nonparametric and parametric
estimates. We first estimate standard earnings equations and then investigate mobility
in the earnings distribution.
The following Tobit regression model is estimated as a way to assess the impact of
individual covariates on future (post–unemployment) earnings wf :
log(w∗f ) = α + β
′x1 + γ′1entitlement period + δ′x2 + ²,
where w∗f = min{wf , c}, x1 is a vector of exogenous observable variables, and x2 is a
vector of variables which control for the unobserved heterogeneity (daily UB transfers,
the duration of unemployment, and other work history variables). ² is the error term.
The censoring of the wage distribution from above (c is the topcoding value) is due to
the upper threshold for social security taxation above which wages are not reported.
1entitlement period is a 3×1 vector for the UB entitlement periods. We choose the indi-
viduals with less than 6 months entitlement period as reference category and model the
effect of longer entitlement periods as a piecewise linear. We include the actual length
of the unemployment spell and the fitted median unemployment duration derived from
the foregoing nonlinear quantile regression model. The actual unemployment dura-
tion controls for the endogenous sorting of the unemployed over elapsed duration of
unemployment and the effect of luck. The median unemployment duration reflects
the endogeneity of reservation wages with respect to the offer wage distribution. This
way, we control for sorting and endogeneity in order to approximate the causal effect
of benefit entitlement periods on post unemployment earnings as an indicator of the
quality of the job.
Table 4 show that the entitlement periods have no effect on post–unemployment
earnings. Only for 6 to 12 months of benefit entitlement, there is a small positive
effect of around 4% for UPIT but such an affect can not be found for NE. All other
coefficients for entitlement periods are insignificant as well. This result of basically no
effect of entitlement periods is consistent with the findings of Fitzenberger and Wilke
(2006b), whereas they differ from Gangl (2002) for Germany.31
31In Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006b), there is no apparent effect of the unemployment insurance on
post unemployment wages. However, the analysis in the first paper uses all unemployment spells in
the IABS and maximum entitlement length instead of actual entitlement periods for unemployment
benefits. For this reason the estimation results are likely to be different from the effect of actual
entitlement periods. Gangl (2002) use rather different methods and samples drawn from survey
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Figure 5 (top) present nonparametric evidence for the mean relation between the
length of unemployment and the position in the post unemployment wage distribution
Fpost (without further controls). It is obvious that there is a negative relationship.
Estimation results of the Tobit model which are presented in table 4 support this
rather descriptive evidence. Our observation should, however, not be understood in
causal way since we do not control for pre–unemployment wages and unobserved factors
are likely to affect estimation results.
As an alternative approach, we estimate the percentile position of all pre- and
post unemployment wages in the yearly IABS wage distribution of full time employ-
ees. Then, we compute the percentile change of the wage position before and after
unemployment, i.e.
∆F = Fpost(wf )− Fpre(wp),
where Fpost and Fpre are the IABS marginal earnings distribution in the year of job loss
and in the year of exit from unemployment, respectively. wf and wp are observed future
and pre–unemployment earnings. The descriptive summary of ∆F can be found in table
5. Apparently, a large share of unemployment periods result in higher wage positions
after unemployment than before unemployment. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006b), who
consider all unemployment spells which begin in the period 1981-1995, find an increase
change in the percentile positions after unemployment in their descriptive analysis. In
contrast, we find a slight decrease of about 3%. However, a regression for ∆F shows
that this descriptive finding may not hold at the individual level (see table 6). As
before we do not obtain any evidence that longer entitlement periods for unemployment
benefits are associated with larger wage increases after unemployment, confirming our
above conclusions.
In contrast, nonparametric evidence (figure 5, bottom) suggests that ∆F decreases
with unemployment duration.32 This observation is supported by the regression es-
timates in table 6. We obtain therefore more robust evidence that long term unem-
ployment and lower post unemployment wages may be negatively related even when
we control for unobserved components. Two further coefficients should be commented
upon: First, the coefficient of having a completed educational degree is not significant.
Second, the coefficient for very low unemployment benefits is highly positive, which
indicates that the unemployed in this group do not exit to employment as long as the
data with its well known drawbacks and limitations compared to administrative data such as limited
sample size and lack of precise information about entitlements for unemployment benefits. Results
are therefore not directly comparable.
32There is a significant monotonic decrease during the first two years of unemployment.
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offer wage does not lie sufficiently above the level of public assistance. Similar strong
effects of reservation wages on unemployment duration in the group of recipients of
public assistance were already observed by Christensen (2005) using household survey
data with information about reservation wages. This is also in accordance with our rea-
soning above why this group has much longer unemployment periods than unemployed
with higher wages before unemployment (and equivalently with lower wage replacement
ratios). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the definition of unemployment plays
only a minor role for the results of the wage analysis.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the determinants of unemployment duration and post unemploy-
ment wages in West Germany for inflows into unemployment during the years 1996 and
1997. We focus on the effect of the length of entitlement periods for unemployment
benefits and the size of unemployment benefits. We use the IAB employment subsam-
ple augmented by information on the entitlement length for unemployment benefits and
the level of unemployment benefits. Since search unemployment is not observed in the
data, we use two definitions for unemployment in the data. Unemployment duration
is analyzed estimating censored Box–Cox quantile regressions, which involve a huge
computational effort. We compute the hazard rates implied by the quantile regression
estimates using a small modification of the simulation method suggested by Machado
et al. (2006). Based on van den Berg (1990), we discuss empirical implications of non-
stationary search theory on unemployment duration and post unemployment duration.
In light of the theoretical considerations, we suggest that estimating flexible quantile
regressions of durations of unemployment is a fruitful alternative for a reduced form
analysis of unemployment duration.
Our estimation results suggest that the length of entitlement periods has only a
weak effect on the conditional distribution of unemployment duration. While it is
generally small for short unemployment duration, it increases for the higher quantiles
of the unemployment duration distribution, in particular for the older unemployed
with extended entitlement periods for unemployment benefits. In contrast, one would
have expected that an increase benefit duration affects in particular the lower quan-
tiles below two years of unemployment. The estimated effects for lower quantiles are
ambiguous: they are either small or results are sensitive to the definition of unem-
ployment. Our results therefore suggest that the true effect is rather small for early
quitters of unemployment, for whom chances are very small, that they do not find a
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job early in their unemployment spell. Moreover, we do not find that individuals with
longer entitlement lengths for unemployment benefits have considerably higher post
unemployment earnings.
There are further important effects. Unemployed with a low level of unemployment
benefit transfers show much longer unemployment duration. A low level of unem-
ployment benefits is often a proxy for supplementary public assistance resulting in a
higher effective replacement ratio compared to effective replacement ratio associated
with higher unemployment benefits. For this reason incentives are lower to leave un-
employment. Our analysis of post unemployment earnings shows that typically the
increase in wages after unemployment is higher for this group than for other groups.
This underlines the importance of reservation wages in the group of recipients of public
assistance as already observed by Christensen (2005). Other estimated effects related
to the unemployment insurance are mainly insignificant or small. We find evidence
for a negative relationship between long term unemployment and post unemployment
wages which we take as evidence for a deterioration of the offer wage distribution over
the course of an unemployment spell.
While the estimated effect of the unemployment insurance is rather small or in-
significant, we observe that estimated coefficients with market policy relevance can
vary over the two definitions of unemployment used in the paper. This highlights the
importance to address data quality issues in applied econometric research. It shows
that incomplete information about individual employment trajectories due to miss-
ing spell information in administrative data - even in presence of detailed information
about policy interventions - may prevent us to obtain precise estimates of the effect of
policy interventions. Our analysis of unemployment duration provides empirical evi-
dence for the inappropriateness of the proportional hazard assumption which is very
popular in applied duration analysis.
Appendix:
A I: Numerical algorithm to estimate censored Box–Cox quan-
tile regression
To estimate a censored Box–Cox quantile regression, we adapt the procedure suggested
in Fitzenberger et al. (2004) to the case of censored Box–Cox quantile regression. The
procedure used in this paper involves the following steps:
1. Decide on an interval [λ, λ] where to search λ.
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2. Estimate βθ(λ) conditional on λ for both λ = λ, λ by
βˆθ(λ) = argminβ
n∑
i=1
ρθ(Tλi −min(x′iβ, ycλi)) .
In the following, use only the set N of observations i for which
λmin(x′iβ, ycλi) + 1 > 0
holds for both λ = λ, λ.
3. For the set of observations N , estimate βθ(λ) conditional on a grid of λ ∈ [λ, λ]
by
βˆθ(λ) = argminβ
∑
i∈N
ρθ(Tλi −min(x′iβ, ycλi)
4. Choose λ on the grid, which minimizes∑
i∈N
ρθ(yi − (λmin(x′iβ, ycλi) + 1)1/λ).
5. In the rare number of cases, when λmin(x′iβ, ycλi) + 1 < 0 for some observation
i ∈ N and some λ 6= λ, λ, we set in step 4
(4) λx′iβˆθ(λ) + 1 = ²
for some small ² > 0 in order to make the objective function well defined.
The linear censored quantile regressions in the approach are estimated using the
algorithm BRCENS implemented in the econometric package TSP as developped by
the first author, see Fitzenberger (1997).
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A II: Tables
Table 1: distribution of entitlement lengths for UB in the IABS for West Germany.
Note: rounding errors
1996 1997
UPIT NE UPIT NE
number of spells 40, 146 48, 794 37, 408 45, 872
≤ 6 months 44% 37% 47% 41%
> 6 - ≤ 12 months 40% 44% 39% 43%
> 12 - ≤ 18 months 2% 2% 3% 3%
> 18 - ≤ 24 months 5% 5% 4% 5%
> 24 months 10% 11% 7% 8%
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Table 2: Descriptive summary of the sample.
UPIT NE
married 54% 53%
vocational training, university degree 80% 80%
agriculture 3% 3%
construction 28% 26%
trade, food 14% 15%
services, public sector 21% 21%
31-35 years old 24% 24%
36-45 years old 35% 35%
46-49 years old 11% 11%
large company 12% 13%
recall 15% 15%
Mid-West Germany 17% 17%
Southern Germany 32% 31%
entitlement period UB > 6-12M. 73% 79%
entitlement period UB > 12-18M. 5% 7%
entitlement period UB > 18-24M. 9% 10%
entitlement period UB >24M. 0% 0%
winter 45% 43%
year 1997 45% 46%
daily UB transfer < 25 EUR 26% 28%
daily UB transfer > 40 EUR 13% 13%
spell length median 111 183
spell length min 1 1
spell length max 2,178 2,190
censored 23% 13%
number of spells 10,295 12,165
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Table 3: Estimated marginal changes of conditional
quantiles (in %) with bootstrap standard errors. NE only.
quantile
variable 0.3 median 0.7
married -15.8 (2.79) -12.7 (2.60) -9.0 (6.43)
vocational training, university degree -18.0 (3.31) -18.6 (2.33) -14.0 (8.14)
agriculture -28.8 (8.57) -36.6 (7.96) -29.0 (15.02)
construction -18.7 (3.95) -31.2 (2.81) -31.0 (9.66)
trade, food 16.0 (5.89) 6.4 (5.74) 4.8 (14.03)
services, public sector 21.5 (6.30) 15.7 (5.78) 15.7 (13.86)
31-35 years old 23.6 (5.27) 20.9 (4.48) 16.4 (13.66)
36-45 years old 43.6 (6.16) 43.7 (5.26) 36.3 (33.99)
46-49 years old 77.4 (11.67) 63.5 (13.86) 56.5 (147.77)
large company 47.0 (8.15) 58.0 (8.69) 51.5 (56.21)
recall -25.4 (3.05) -27.4 (3.28) -24.8 (7.19)
Mid-West Germany -6.4 (3.97) -6.4 (3.66) -5.3 (11.96)
Southern Germany -7.6 (4.52) -7.9 (4.76) -10.7 (7.01)
entitlement period UB > 6-12M. 0.67 (3.26) -1.3 (2.68) 1.3 (6.89)
entitlement period UB > 12-18M. 12.3 (5.04) 8.3 (4.28) 10.0 (11.07)
entitlement period UB > 18M. 29.0 (11.46) 39.1 (20.64) 46.5 (94.99)
winter -29.4 (21.03) -34.8 (21.98) -29.8 (195.21)
year 1997 -9.7 (2.36) -11.8 (2.23) -14.7 (7.00)
daily UB transfer < 25 EUR 71.2 (3.16) 59.6 (2.15) 40.2 (5.91)
daily UB transfer > 40 EUR -3.0 (4.39) -8.8 (4.05) -11.5 (7.28)
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Table 4: Results of Tobit regression
UPIT NE
variable t-value t-value
const 4.107621 0.000000 4.043976 0.000000
married −0.044212∗ -5.146006 −0.041395∗ -4.094121
voc. training/univ. degree 0.085150∗ 10.046091 0.121084∗ 11.355181
agriculture −0.079133∗ -3.199710 −0.071254∗ -2.358123
construction 0.011257 1.175916 0.018926 1.592678
trade, food −0.048750∗ -3.632571 −0.034881∗ -2.317828
services, public sector −0.026842∗ -2.071184 −0.024427∗ -1.709216
31-35 years old 0.002132 0.184195 0.003001 0.218855
36-45 years old 0.003987 0.317059 -0.018166 -1.249449
46-49 years old -0.021617 -1.006293 −0.058924∗ -2.258551
large company -0.007458 -0.489883 -0.023134 -1.252895
recall 0.029185∗ 2.691904 0.024482 1.958401
Mid-West Germany 0.001337 0.120759 0.001498 0.113925
Southern Germany 0.004719 0.530154 0.020837 1.944799
entitlement period UB > 6-12M. 0.042185∗ 3.676033 -0.000270 -0.014025
entitlement period UB > 12-18M. 0.011002 0.569228 -0.000251 -0.011860
entitlement period UB > 18M. 0.037241 1.517098 0.037268 1.288558
winter 0.027172∗ 3.184621 0.035714∗ 3.573937
year 1997 0.014996 1.429624 -0.004156 -0.329732
daily UB transfer < 25 EUR −0.227572∗ -21.924623 −0.220896∗ -18.514528
daily UB transfer > 40 EUR 0.304376∗ 23.428170 0.342067∗ 22.204962
length of unemployment > 3-6 months −0.052960∗ -5.117364 −0.055397∗ -4.075046
length of unemployment > 6-9 months −0.035986∗ -2.257697 -0.034167 -1.778273
length of unemployment > 9-12 months -0.025006 -1.138349 -0.007180 -0.292068
length of unemployment > 12-18 months 0.009883 0.422999 -0.041513 -1.713596
length of unemployment > 18 months −0.076820∗ 3.621366 −0.182297∗ -9.849390
fitted median > 3-6 months 0.023952 0.000000 0.083175 0.000000
fitted median > 6-9 months 0.022806 1.955828 0.032525∗ 2.207949
fitted median > 9-12 months 0.016498 1.099032 -0.002608 -0.178879
fitted median > 12-18 months 0.033896 1.489930 0.031736∗ 1.999240
fitted median > 18 months -0.072541 -1.488609 -0.004803 -0.167777
Log-likelihood -3177.6618 -7471.8268
Observations; # of censored 7,886 ; 18 10,566 ; 30
*: significant at the 5% level
Table 5: Descriptive summary of ∆F .
UPIT NE
mean −0.03 −0.04
median −0.02 −0.03
standard deviation 0.21 0.23
share of ∆i > 0 42% 42%
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Table 6: Results of OLS regression on ∆F
UPIT NE
variable t-value t-value
const −0.0068 −0.3745 -0.0231 -0.9227
married 0.0188∗ 3.6415 0.0253∗ 4.7644
voc. training/univ. degree 0.0013 0.2084 0.0054 0.8405
agriculture 0.0227 1.4849 0.0220 1.3833
construction −0.0188∗ −2.8001 -0.0154 -1.9037
trade, food −0.0028 −0.3684 0.0000 0.0010
services, public sector 0.0256∗ 3.5433 0.0227∗ 3.4091
31-35 years old −0.0011 −0.1693 -0.0086 -1.3080
36-45 years old −0.0067 −0.8771 −0.0225∗ -2.8990
46-49 years old −0.0143 −1.0993 −0.0385∗ -2.9033
large company −0.0181∗ −2.0091 −0.0310∗ -3.0845
recall 0.0158∗ 2.0760 0.0091 1.0783
Mid-West Germany 0.0081 1.2438 0.0037 0.5777
Southern Germany −0.0130∗ −2.5131 -0.0088 -1.7672
entitlement period UB > 6-12M. −0.0205∗ −2.8180 -0.0062 -0.6005
entitlement period UB > 12-18M. −0.0246∗ −2.2797 -0.0086 -0.8717
entitlement period UB > 18M. 0.0045 0.3296 0.0075 0.5510
winter −0.0116∗ −2.2302 -0.0077 -1.5091
year 1997 −0.0042 −0.5810 -0.0129 -1.5719
daily UB transfer < 25 EUR 0.0792∗ 13.3330 0.0875∗ 15.6583
daily UB transfer > 40 EUR −0.0152∗ −2.0899 −0.0273∗ -3.7791
length of unemployment > 3-6 months −0.0349∗ −5.9957 −0.0321∗ -5.0719
length of unemployment > 6-9 months −0.0122 −1.3809 -0.0073 -0.8187
length of unemployment > 9-12 months −0.0056 −0.4568 -0.0003 -0.0301
length of unemployment > 12-18 months −0.0232 −1.7840 -0.0196 -1.7483
length of unemployment > 18 months −0.0034 −0.2895 −0.0194∗ -2.2649
fitted median length > 3-6 months 0.0066 0.5046 0.0111 0.6682
fitted median length > 6-9 months 0.0033 0.3984 0.0040 0.4349
fitted median length > 9-12 months 0.0040 0.4468 0.0041 0.5184
fitted median length > 12-18 months 0.0173 1.3355 -0.0029 -0.3426
fitted median length > 18 months −0.0006 −0.0208 0.0140 0.9804
R2 0.0559 0.0505
Nobs 7,886 10,566
*: significant at the 5% level
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Figure 3: Estimated percentage change of the conditional quantile function at the
sample means of the other regressors, black line: NE, grey line: UPIT, part I
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sample means of the other regressors, black line: NE, grey line: UPIT, part II
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with 90% wild bootstrap confidence bands. grey: UPIT, black: NE
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